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Financial transactions and fiduciary obligations are simply intertwined. Fiduciaries are subject to 
the principle of fidelity. It appears, at times at least, public trust in fiduciary commitments is 
declining as a result of fiduciaries’ selective reporting of financial events and the existence of 
conflicts when fiduciaries have selfish motives: motives being not always to maximize the 
trusting party’s value. It is the agency problem. This work attempts to enunciate that 
commitments and fiduciary obligations emanating from initial financial transactions are not to be 
violated or ignored as a matter of policy or practice. The questions that arise are: Should a 
fiduciary be obliged to guarantee a certain outcome for the counter-party, and should a fiduciary 
be held accountable to a certain type of outcome? We examine what the guidelines are or should 
be put in place. Initially, under the garb of some socio-religions edicts-cum-dicta, and then under 
the well-known economic analytics, we make our points and move the view to the forefront. 
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Governance encompassing ethical issues that entail a display of meaningful loyalty in all forms 
of political and corporate conducts has been a subject of intense debate over many years, and 
over the past decade, in particular, since Enron, WorldCom, Pharmalat, OneTel, Inforsys, Dubai 
World and other financial disasters. Performing in the professionally responsible and loyal 
fashion with respect to other people’s resources or firm’s commitment of funds ought to 
characterize the conduct of investment managers and or fiduciary agents.  
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Technically, it is the issue of profit creation vis-a-vi shareholders’, that is, investors’ wealth 
build-up. Often, however, investors are significantly deprived of the fruits their investment funds 
spawn. Stone notes (1934), “….when the history of the financial era which has just drawn to a 
close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and its major faults will be ascribed to the failure 
to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ, that - 'a man cannot serve two 
masters’.”  More than a century ago, equity gave a hospitable reception to that principle and the 
common law was not slow to follow in giving it recognition. No thinking man can believe that an 
economy built upon a business foundation can permanently endure without some loyalty to that 
principle. Regrettably, over the past few decades, fiduciary obligation became a judicial feat.  In 
essence, less time and thought have been afforded to the concept of loyalty or fiduciary 
obligation, which is often associated with trust and trust-like relationships in which conflicts of 
interest and duty tend to arise (Flannigan, 1989).  
Consistent with these views, DeMott (1988) contends that it may very well be the lack of 
discussions about what fiduciary entails that have created the current investigations into several 
improprieties that relate public’s lack of faith in the reporting practices of corporations and the 
functioning of capital markets. Any breach of public trust amongst stakeholders requires one to 
revisit the moral and ethical obligations which include accountability, honesty, and transparency 
of each stakeholder in a trust relationship. Should governments and corporations wish to be 
virtuous and free, the obligations of moral leadership associated with the vocation can in no way 
be relinquished.  
There is a long list of studies that relate religious and moral teachings on fiduciary obligation 
in government and business management. Islamic scholars have undertaken a thorough 
examination of relevant verses from the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah: Ariff and Iqbal (2011). 
They have established the basic principles that govern the rights and obligations of participants 
in the financial transactions. A dishonest dealing by a fiduciary is presented in the parable of the 
dishonest steward in the Holy Bible (Luke, Chapter 16) where the unjust steward was accused by 
his master for squandering the master’s wealth. While this parable is cited many a times in 
Christian communities, no evidence exists whether this is widespread in current business 
dealings. It would suffice to say that the frequency with which the media are reporting issues 
relating to fraudulent conduct, poor stewardship and errors of omission and commission of 
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deceptions is increasing at an exponential rate. Inherent and systemic corruptions in governments 
have also been witnessed more recently. Consequently, the causes of the catastrophic collapse of 
governments and corporations require deeper meaning and understanding of fiduciary obligation.      
From an Islamic perspective, Beekun and Badawi (2005) argue that the link between Islam 
and business management has been sparse. Trust and benevolence are variables that are factored 
into an Islamic business model together with justice and balance. In Islam there are two primary 
sources, namely the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah or Hadith, both of which recommend 
unequivocally what fiduciary obligation is. Essentially, the primary sources have implications for 
both individual and collective economic conducts. Moreover, economic as well as non-economic 
values, norms and codes are inscribed in the Shari’ah Islamiyah, commonly referred to as 
Islamic Law that draws extensively and exclusively from the two primary sources.  According to 
Kamali (1989), the Shari’ah “refers to commands, prohibitions, guidance and the principles that 
God has addressed to mankind pertaining to their conduct in this world and [for] salvation in the 
next”. The findings in the literature suggest that compliance to the revealed sources of 
knowledge (Holy Qur’an and Sunnah) and compliance to Shari’ah ought to be given the highest 
priority as sources of fiduciary power. Any potential for objectionable behavior ought to be 
thwarted by a conscious sense of internalized Islamic values.  
The Western viewpoint DeMott (1988) in her seminal work contends that fiduciary 
obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American law. Notwithstanding the 
issues surrounding fiduciary obligation, an important clarification was made by Canada's 
Supreme Court by McLachlin (2003) where a majority of the Court agreed with McLachlin when 
she stated  that fiduciary obligations were not obligations to guarantee a certain outcome for the 
vulnerable party, regardless of  the fault.  They do not hold the fiduciary to a certain type of 
outcome, exposing the fiduciary to liability whenever the vulnerable party is harmed by one of 
the fiduciary’s employees.  Rather, they hold the fiduciary to a certain type of conduct. This 
suggests that a fiduciary is not a guarantor of a certain outcome and a fiduciary does not breach 
his or her duties by simply failing to obtain the best result for the beneficiary.  
Perhaps the widespread prevalence of these decisions in Western courts may have coincided 
with the actions of individual Muslims and therefore a sense of incongruence surrounding 
fiduciary obligation have crept into Islamic business conduct. The very nature of the terms 
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“fiduciary” and “obligation” renders them to a sense of discrepancy resulting in some divergence 
between Islamic philosophy and practice in economic life. The latter term, namely “obligation” 
is used in a variety of personal situations and embodies responsibility and accountability the 
extent of which is immeasurable. The former entails the use of the Latin word fiducia meaning 
trust and fidere meaning to trust. The issue that further exacerbates the definition is whether 
fiduciary obligation is intrinsic or extrinsic. In this regard the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
(1997) wrote of fiduciary as follows: every servant and every agent owes to his master or 
principal duties of good faith and fidelity (intrinsic).  (S)he owes those duties because the law 
imports those duties as a contractual term or because the contract contains an express term to that 
effect (extrinsic) or because a court of equity would have imposed an obligation of good faith 
and fidelity as a matter of conscience (extrinsic and intrinsic).  As a result the complex 
relationship existing in a servant-master and agent-principal scenario, a legal test for fiduciary 
duty is paramount. Servants and agents together with masters and principals have an intrinsic 
fiduciary obligation to safeguard their own interpersonal interests. The applicability of fiduciary 
and obligation in variety of contexts presents an opportunity to determine situation-specific 
fiduciary obligation. Resolving conflicts of obligations in fiduciary relationships requires an 
understanding of several subjective issues related to trust, faith and honesty. 
From an Islamic perspective, Khan and Thaut (2007) in their seminal work on an Islamic 
perspective on fair trade, maintains that economic exchange in the form of trade and commerce 
played a vital role in the expansion of Islam and Islamic values of kinship, tradition and 
communal relationship.  Scholars have identified Mecca as the birthplace of Islam and Mecca 
was a market and center for commerce. Khan and Thaut (2007) suggest that the early Muslims 
merchants were not only engaged in trade but they went to distant lands in connection with 
business. Moreover, they identify the Prophet Muhammad as a successful trader with integrity 
for which he was conferred the title ‘The Trustworthy’. This perhaps presented an opportunity to 
preach Islam and therefore a literature review suggests that fiduciary obligation in early Islam 
became intrinsic through the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad.  The golden rule appears in the 
following statements attributed as revelation to Muhammad, “Woe to those . . . who, when they 
have to receive by measure from men, exact full measure, but when they have to give by 
measure or weight to men, give less than due”: Qur’an (Surah 83: verse 1). 
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The rich value system of trust, honor and duty in Islam ought to be gradually passed on from 
one generation to another. Moreover, wealth should be circulated widely and not held or 
concentrated in the hands of a few. To encourage circulation of wealth, the Shari’ah encourages 
responsible trade. The Shari’ah also promotes commutative sales contracts and thereby the 
attainment of a monetized economy rather than barter. On the redistributive side, the Shari’ah 
also institutes Zakat, which is a religious tax based on wealth or income depending on the 
category of wealth held by Muslims. This is obligatory on all Muslims who possess wealth 
beyond a fixed minimum and hold it for at least one calendar year. The Islamic State collects it, 
in the absence of which individuals are obliged to pay it voluntarily on their own to the 
beneficiaries designated by the Qur’an (poor, indigent, travelers, bankrupt, zakat collectors), to 
liberate slaves or oppressed people and “in the way of God” especially in the month of fasting.  
The foundations of the social system of Islam rest on the belief that all human beings are equal 
and constitute one single fraternity. In this regard a fiduciary is expected to act thoughtfully and 
expediently. In the West courts impose a fiduciary obligation on the trusted party whereas in 
Islam one’s conscience and one’s submission to Shari’ah play a more meaningful role. Good 
conscience requires one to act at all times in the interest of the trusting party.   
1.1 Identifying Trust and Obligation in Fiduciary Obligation 
Since a fiduciary is one who is in a position of trust and him or her becoming the locus of 
control, it is the very essential characteristics of trust and control that present major problems in 
a fiduciary’s obligations. Typically, a person or groups of interested persons get to trust one 
another for particular objectives or to accomplish certain tasks.  A manifestation of trust becomes 
essential for commercial and economic activities to be sustained. Trust can be abused by the 
trusted parties when they do not act with care and diligence. The trusted party may intentionally 
divert value away from the party who has reposed the trust.  A literature survey would identify at 
least three types of trust in corporate relationships. These include deterrence-based trust; 
knowledge-based trust and identification-based trust.  In this regard Flannigan (1989) argues that 
only two types trust give rise to fiduciary obligations.  He contends that in the first instance a 
person may trust another in an unconstrained and uninhibited personal way.   
This form of trust is generally a result of feelings of intimacy or security brought about by 
the affection or concern for another and may also arise out of past trust experiences or conduct 
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created over time.  At times this form of trust may come up instantly as a result of the office 
occupied by the trusted person or as a result of his or her knowledge, experience and expertise. 
Flannigan (1989) considers this as a 'deferential' kind of trust in that the trusting person will 
defer to the judgment of the trusted person. This deference may be total, or it may be only partial 
or situational and it is accompanied, in some cases, by elements of necessity, dependence or 
submission. In other cases there is no demonstrated vulnerability. However, what is paramount in 
relation to fiduciary obligation is that the trusted person is secured in the knowledge that his or 
her judgment is being relied on in the circumstances.   
In the second form of trust identified by Flannigan (1989) there is typically no deference or 
vulnerability involved and an example given is the kind of trust that employers have in their 
agents and servants. In the Flannigan paradigm then employers expect their agents and servants 
to act faithfully although they do not have unreserved faith in them. They remain wary and, in 
extreme circumstances, even skeptical of them. Employers are 'vigilant' in the sense of remaining 
aware. They trust their agents and employees, but remain observant for signs that their trust is 
misplaced. The expectation underlying this kind of trust is that of fair dealing between competent 
and capable persons.  Bogle (2009) cites Adam Smith who contented already in the 18th century 
that managers of other people’s money rarely watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which . . . they watch over their own . . . they very easily give themselves a dispensation, and 
Bogle (2009) concludes that management negligence prevails to a point of an almost complete 
disregard of their duty and responsibility to their principals.  Following this trend of thought, one 
would argue that a dishonest steward could certainly guilty of a clear breach of fiduciary duty by 
failing to administer the property solely in the interest of the beneficiary and continuingto serve 
his own interest.   
1.2 Relations in Fiduciary Obligation 
Fiduciary obligation is a necessary feature of an agency relationship. In this regard 
Flannigan (1989) posits that an understanding of the relationship and obligation that renders “the 
overall legal regime in which the interests of the various parties are accommodated or balanced”.  
When someone has undertaken to act for and on behalf of another in a particular matter, this 
gives rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. Some fiduciary relations are more intense 
than others.  The relationships could include, among others, beneficiaries and trustees; wards and 
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guardians; principals and agents; clients and lawyers; administrators of estates and executors; 
and next of kin and legatees.   
The board of directors and the various officers are in a fiduciary relationship to the 
corporation and to the shareholders.  Moreover, each partner in a partnership is in a fiduciary 
relationship to the other partners. The partner has the duty and power to consider and take care of 
the interests of the other partners, too.  Following the same trend of thought, Scott (1949) writing 
in the California Law Review contends that the greater the independent authority to be exercised 
by the fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty. “A trustee is under a stricter duty of 
loyalty than is an agent upon whom limited authority is conferred or a corporate director who can 
act only as a member of the board of directors or a promoter acting for investors in a new 
corporation.”  
1.3 From Agency Theory to Stewardship Theory 
Schoorman, Mayer and Davis (2007) identify trust as an important aspect of a business 
relationship. Risk is at the core of business undertakings, and therefore it would not be surprising 
to conclude that trust would lead to risk taking in business relationships. The idea that 
“willingness to take risk” is embedded in trust. It is the view expounded by Sitkin and George 
(2005). This, however, spawns the scope for opportunistic and self-serving conduct of agents 
which presents challenges in a fiduciary relationship. As a result, the notion that an agent may 
not act in accordance with the interest of the principal, commonly referred to as agency conflict, 
and may subject the principal to several agency costs.  These costs according to Flannigan (1989) 
are not created solely by those in the legal class of agents but other intermediaries and co-
participants in ventures, too.   
The function of the fiduciary obligation within this context would be to discourage any 
conduct that results in such intermediary or agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976), in their 
classic work on the theory of the firm, managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure, identify corporate managers as agents who are engaged to maximize the returns to 
principals, namely the shareholders.  They assert that as agents do not own the corporation’s 
resources, they may commit certain ‘moral hazards’ merely to enhance their own personal wealth 
at the cost of their principals when they contract with executives to manage their firms for them. 
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In this regard Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) contention that the agency theory 
provides a useful way of explaining relationships where the parties' interests are at odds and can 
be brought more into alignment through proper monitoring and a well-planned compensation 
system stands valid. However, a more comprehensive theory such as the stewardship theory 
needs to be considered for further knowledge and understanding on the issue. 
A distinguishing feature of the two different theories namely, agency theory from 
stewardship theory is the use of trust versus control systems to manage risk. The stewardship 
theory defines human behavior conduct beyond economic perspectives of perquisites. The 
literature dealing with stewardship is somewhat limited. On the surface, stewardship seems to be 
a simple concept, but the associated obligations are difficult to actualize. Stakeholders are held 
accountable for their decisions that ought to lead to sustainable institutions and overall care of 
the various capitals entrusted to them. These include resources in the form of human capital, 
financial capital, natural resources, social capital and cultural capital.  As Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson (1997) see it, the stewardship theory has its roots in psychology and sociology; it 
examines situations in which executives as stewards are motivated to act in the best interests of 
their principals where the model of man is based on a steward whose conduct is ordered such 
that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviors have higher utility than individualistic, self-
serving behaviors. This is reflective essentially of general partner vis-à-vis limited partner in 
partnership model of business venture.  
It is argued then that given a choice between self-serving behavior and pro-organizational 
behavior, “a steward's behavior will not depart from the interests of his or her organization”. “A 
steward will not substitute or trade self-serving behaviors for cooperative behaviors. Thus, even 
where the interests of the steward and the principal are not aligned, the steward places higher 
value on cooperation than defection …. because the steward perceives greater utility in 
cooperative behavior and behaves accordingly, his or her behavior can be considered rational”. If 
one considers the principal’s point of view that a fiduciary needs to protect and provide guidance 
and support to an organization together with the singular hope of ensuring the resources are 
handed over to new stewards in a condition that is as good or better, then the stewardship theory 
seems superior. Religious teachings manifest stewardship theory in many forms. One can see this 
in the parable of the talents in the Bible (Luke, Chapter 19) “Well done, good and faithful slave! 
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You have been faithful in a few things. I will put you in charge of many things. Enter into the joy 
of your master.”   
From an Islamic viewpoint, Khalifa is the Arabic term for stewardship or fiduciary defined 
as a person or persons who hold(s) assets in trust for a beneficiary.  Khalifa relates to the nature 
of a legal trust (holding of something in trust for another).  This entails a fiduciary contract in a 
fiduciary capacity with fiducial power.  It is illegal for a fiduciary to misappropriate resources for 
personal gain.  One of the well known Hadith of Prophet Muhammad “Kullu kum ra’in wa’ kullu 
ra’in mas’ool an rai’yatay-hi…” meaning that “Every one of you is a caretaker, and every 
caretaker is responsible for what he is caretaker of’” defines the nature of stewardship in Islam. 
It signifies and requires that fiduciary obligations must be honored always.  
   
2. Business, Ethics and Profits 
In section 1, we have discussed and adumbrated the moralistic approach, rooted in religious 
edicts and principles, that fiduciary obligations must be met because of the overarching 
importance of trusts and commitments underlying the financial transactions or any commitments. 
We have noted that fraudulent behavior often emerges and commitments are not met. Here, 
within the framework of economic principles, we bring out the same issue and examine the root 
or underlying calculation of the violation of commitments. In the area of economics, ethics 
appears more in the name of reality and corporate governance than in the name of didactic 
dictums. In a piece (2010), Ghosh, Ghosh and Zaher  have raised the issue: business, ethics, and 
profits: are they compatible under corporate governance in our global economy? They have 
noted and observed the following: 
“….the traditional belief that profits and ethics are at odds with each other in the world of business. Corporate 
governance appears to be a hindrance or a drag on profit maximization. (They)  show that moral codes, public 
interest and social values pose no threat to profit maximization of any firm. It is demonstrated with the 
illustration of transfer pricing and public goods-based economy that profits and ethics are quite compatible 
within the strait jacket of societal norms and corporate goals.” 
In the Section I, we have indicated that agents who are the custodians of people funds may 
engage in practices that are not consistent the investors’ interest. To make the point louder we 
bring out a sketchy income statement of a firm as follows, and then point to the reality that 
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counter-productive conduct of fiduciary agents may go against their own snatch-it-all, snatch-it-
away short-term goal of maximizing fiduciary interest: 
Table 1: Income statement of XYZ corporation  
      ___________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Gross revenue ( XPR .= )      $100,000.000 
2. minus fixed costs, including agents’ salary and bonus (F)      20,000,000 
3. minus variable costs, e.g., wages, utilities, etc. (V)       25,000,000 
4. Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)        55,000,000 
5. minus interest expenses, bondholders, banks, etc. (I)       15,000,000 
6. Taxable income or profit before taxes (PBT)        40,000,000 
7. minus taxes @25% (T)          10,000,000 
8. Net income (NY)           30,000,000 
9. minus dividends to preferred stock holders (PD)       10,000,000 
10. Earnings available to common stock holders (EAC)       20,000,000 
     _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EAC (in line 10) is the shareholders net wealth or net profit. If the agents of XYZ Corporation 
increase their emolument to make line 2 to be more (say, $30,000,000), ceteres paribus, line 10 
drops to $12,500,000.  Fiduciary (that is, the top management of the firm or any individual 




+≡= . Here N is the number of shares outstanding, ,, DPSEPS and 
interest on loan are well-known and well-accepted fact of economic calculus that the discounted 









measures the value of a share of the investor (where tDPS is 
the dividend per share at time 1 and the time horizon for dividend flows is T periods from now. 
It is evident now that if  EAC is reduced by fiduciary by his/her grab-all or grab-most policy in 
line 2, EPS drops and the value of the share drops, fiduciary’s compensation (fixed salary and 
bonus) has to go down, and in extreme situations the fiduciary can be given the pink slip. Any 
prudent and far-sighted manager must therefore be induced to keep the obligation intact to the 
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extent possible for the reality of economic dynamics, even if ethics and moral pressure are not 
persuasive enough.  
 Note obligation is a constraint. Economics is the science of constrained optimization (that 
is, either maximization or minimization). Wealth maximization or profit maximization is never 
unconstrained. In the world of business we encounter two facets of economic reality 
simultaneously in general equilibrium: profit maximization (by producers-cum-sellers) and 
utility maximization (by consumers). When business ownership is construed within the 
straitjacket of corporate structure, profit maximization turns into what we have already labeled as 
wealth maximization of shareholders.  
Since corporations are managed by agents such as the Board of directors, CEOs and CFOs 
and so on, we know, as already noted, the agency problem, – the conflict between agents and 
owners of firms (that is, shareholders) rears its head, and this creates the failure by the agents to 
keep their commitment or obligation as self-interest dominates  in their operations and 
calculations. Corporate governance has come into existence to reduce or eliminate this conflict of 
interest. The existing literature waxes eloquently on various facets on this and related aspects and 
concerns. Following the classic work of Jensen, and Meckling (1976), followed by Fama (1980), 
and a series of papers (e.g., Fama and Jensen (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986),  Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Jensen and Murphy (1990),  Agrawal and  
Knoeber (1996), Han and Suk (1998), Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000),  to wit a few) has 
examined how business, ethics, and profits can be compatible under the rules of corporate 
governance. 
 It is should be noted, however, that most people think business firms and contractual deals 
are driven solely by profit motives. Baumol (1959, 1962, 1970), Williamson (1964), Hicks 
[1954], and others, however,  have raised questions as to the adequacy, tenability and unqualified 
validity of that view, particularly within the framework of long-term maximization principle.  To 
Frank Knight (1888), “… perhaps no term or concept in economic discussion is used with a more 
bewildering variety of well-established meanings than profits”.  Building further on Hawley’s 
view, Knight considers profits as rewards for taking risks and facing uncertainty, notion alluded 
independently in Section 1.   
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No matter how we construe profits, we recognize that business and profits are intimately 
linked and financial transactions and fiduciary obligations are intertwined. The issue at hand is:  
what has ethics to do with either business or profits?  It is normally perceived that ethics is a set 
of moral codes that usually stands to inhibit wanton pursuit of selfish interest, and thus it puts a 
brake on the profits a corporation seeks to make and enlarge (and agents often try to divert them 
away from equity holders). Very aptly, profits and ethics in this view are at odds with each other.  
The governments - federal, state and local - in most societies watch over the business practices of 
corporations and other profit-seeking entities in an effort to resolve any conflict between the two 
ends. The Anti-Trust division of the U.S. Justice Department regularly checks out and forestalls 
the creation of unwanted monopoly power in the United States.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) monitors trading and brokerage houses, and makes insider trading outright 
illegal. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) makes sure that every business organization fulfills 
its tax liabilities, provides the correct compensation to its employees and social security benefits, 
and so on. Tax evasion is a felony punishable by laws in any land. In this view, it appears that 
ethics is antithetic to a positive business climate. Empirical evidence can be cited to make this 
point clear in real life. In a more comprehensive work we can document claims made that ethics 
and profit are mutually exclusive.   
Here, in this paper, we show that profits and ethics are not necessarily at loggerheads with 
each other. Fiduciaries should realize that and should avoid non-fulfillment of fiduciary 
obligation. Indeed, efforts to link ethics as a management tool to increase productivity and 
ultimately profits have been verified by Burke and Black (1990).  It is possible to identify many 
claims that “…when we do what we believe is proper [i.e. ethical], the company gains.”  Some 
practitioners who have strongly incorporated social responsibility have noted that their gross 
yields are comparable to anyone in money market funds.  While, Anita Roddick of The Body 
Show, a company committed to ethical decision-making, stresses that “for more than 10 of 15 
years that it has been in business, its sales have grown an average of 50 percent a year. William 
Ouchi (1981) sums up that “….profits are the reward to the firm as it continues to provide true 
value to customers, to help its employees to grow, and to behave responsibly as a corporate 
citizen.”  
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On the other hand, it may appear at times that relaxation of ethical standards may enhance 
profitability, whereas rigorous enforcement of the existing ethical standards and/or introduction 
of additional ones will attenuate profits as well as the growth of business in our societies.  Our 
conclusion is that such a perception is faulty, and often misleading and deceptive.  It may be 
contended, and a point is always made by the opponents of ethics in business, that laissez faire 
means the absence of any impediment, and any ethical codes are noting but impairment of 
business. 
2.1 What is the Goal of Business: Social Responsibility and/or Profitability? 
 Milton Friedman (1970) article in the New York Times Magazines, “The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its profits,” begins the debate which continues today.  
Labeling the concept and any application of social responsibility as a “fundamentally subversive 
doctrine,” Friedman has emphasized that the doctrine “does harm the foundations of a free 
society.”  Further, he stresses that the only responsibility of business is “to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase profits.” Arguments immediately from many scholars, 
Stone (1975), Bell (1973), and Goodpaster, and Matthews (1982) counter the Milton doctrine. 
  Almost two decades later, Grant (1991), in “Friedman Fallacies” calls Friedman’s 
argument ‘erroneous’ because it rests on assumptions of an “apolitical political base, altruistic 
agents of a selfishness and good derived from greed .” O’Neil and Pienta (1994) argue that 
“profitability is a legitimate end of a business, but must be moderated by ethical considerations.”  
The authors note that schools of business are one place where selfishness is considered a virtue  
legitimatized by the profit maximization model.  Few have tested the ethics/profit proposition 
and where empirical evidence does exist when they are conflicting.  Owen and Scherer (1993) 
cite almost an equal number of studies which supports as it reject a positive relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and firm financial performance. The major findings note that 
actions related to environmental pollution, corporate philanthropy and information disclosure 
have the greatest effect on market share.  The evidence is modest, but the argument for including 
ethical decision making in firms as a responsibility is overwhelming.  One of the clearest 
statements of the multiple responsibilities, beyond making a profit, of business is by Angelidis 
and Ibrahim (1991) who state that the diverse expectations of managers include “maximizing 
profits for owners and shareholders and for operating within the legal framework.  They are also 
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expected to support their employees’ quality of work life, to demonstrate their concern for the 
communities within which their business operates, to minimize the impact of various hazards on 
the global environment, and to engage in purely social or philanthropic endeavors.”   
2.2 A Multinational Corporation (MNC) and its Potential Behavior   
It is often observed or otherwise one can easily visualize that if a multinational corporation is 
not prohibited from being engaged in transfer pricing, it will undoubtedly enter into it because of 
its gains in way of tax savings can be made and the resultant increase in corporate income in the 
consolidated income statements of the company can be realized.  Scholar such as Fowler (1978), 
Eden (1998), and many others have examined transfer pricings and corporate income 
extensively. It is and can be contended that if capital is raised from all markets where the MNC 
operates, it can be shown that increase in consolidated income of the corporation via transfer 
pricing is not necessarily beneficial to the enterprise.  To make the point clear, examine the 
following hypothetical income statements of the corporations and its subsidiaries or affiliates.  
Let A and B be two subsidiaries (or affiliates) of the company, and C be the parent (combined) 
company.   
Table 2: Income statement 
 A B C 
Sales (R) $100,000 $200,000 $200,000 
COGS (C) (60,000) (100,000) (60,000) 
EBIT 40,000 100,000 140,000 
Interest (I) (4,000) (4,000) (8,000) 
Income (NI) 21,600 57,600 79,200 
 
Table 3: Modified income statement 
 A B C 
Sales (R) $150,000 $200,000 $200,000 
COGS (C) (60,000) (150,000) (60,000) 
EBIT 90,000 50,000 140,000 
Interest (I) (4,000) (4,000) (8,000) 
Income (NI) 51,600 27,600 79,200 
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The first situation is a depiction of the corporation’s low mark-up policy, and the modified 
statement describes the high mark-up policy under a constant marginal corporate income tax rate 
of the 40 percent.  Manipulative behavior, - doctoring the subsidiary-level mark up and transfer 
pricing do neither change the total liability nor the total corporate income.  But, if the tax rates 
are different for A and B, then the transfer pricing underlying this statement structure yields a 
different picture.  Let us assume that A faces 25 percent tax rate and B faces the same old 40 
percent rate of taxation.  Under this modification, the income statements presented earlier appear 
as follows:   
Table 4: Income statement 
 A B C 
Sales (R) $100,000 $200,000 $200,000 
COGS (C) (60,000) (100,000) (60,000) 
EBIT 40,000 100,000 140,000 
Interest (I) (4,000) (4,000) (8,000) 
PBT 36,000 96,000 132,000 
Taxes (T) (9,400) (38,400) (47,400) 
Income (NI) 27,000 57,600 84,600 
 
Table 5: Modified income statement 
 A B C 
Sales (R*) $150,000 $200,000 $200,000 
COGS (C) (60,000) (150,000) (60,000) 
EBIT 90,000 50,000 140,000 
Interest (I) (4,000) (4,000) (8,000) 
PBT 86,000 46,000 132,000 
Taxes (T) (21,500) (18,400) (39,900) 
Income (NI) 64,500 27,600 92,100 
 
Here, transfer pricing in combination with high mark-up at A generates tax savings of $7,500 (= 
$47,400 - $39,900), and thus increases the corporate earnings of $7,500 (= $92,100 - $84,600).  
Because of this extra gain under differential tax structure, the corporation is seemingly induced 
to enter into unethical behavior of not pursuing the “arm’s length” transactions.   
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Let us go beyond the numerical framework and introduce a theoretical structure around 
those paradigms presented earlier.  Let us use the following notations: 
 iR = sales proceeds of company I ( CBAi ,,= );  
 C = costs of goods sold (COGS); 
EBIT  = earnings before interest and taxes (= gross profits); 
I  = Interest expense or debt charge, assumed constant for  both A and B; 
PBT i= profits before taxes of i (= taxable income); 
    iT = corporate tax for i; 
     iNI = net income of i. 
From definition, one can derive the following: 
}){1( ICRTNI AAA −−−=        (1) 
}){1( ICRTNI BBB −−−=        (2) 
and }){1( ICRTNI CCC −−−=        (3) 
It is obvious that if TTT BA == (say, 40%), then transfer pricing markup differential is 
inconsequential.   However, if TTT BA =<    (say 40%), the company will attempt to change the 
mark-up policy and engage in transfer pricing.   
The question is: is the MNC really gaining by unethical practice in this case? The answer is 
not affirmative in clear terms.  First, in corporate environment where reward of the agents are 
performance based, A and B are made to go through financial facelifts. A is made to look 
superior and B inferior, as the last line of Table 4 exhibits. This may indeed create uncomfortable 
positions in two subsidiaries and diminution of actual as well as potential incentives towards 
growth and stability. Intercompany enmity may do more damage than the potential gain 
unethically the company can generate in such data manipulation.  The section 482 of the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Code prohibits this practice of transfer pricing.   
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The IRS regulations provide three ways and means to establish arm’s length price: (i) 
comparable uncontrolled prices, (ii) cost plus, and (iii) resale prices.  The OECD committee on 
Fiscal Affairs did make the same recommendation for European countries.  Any attempt to get 
around these regulatory codes may be deliberately leaked because of the rivalry created through 
transfer pricing mechanism, and that may lead to disastrous consequences involving a much 
larger loss than the original profit created through contrivance. Secondly, distortion in the 
reallocation process will affect the capital market position for both A and B.  B will have reduced 
earnings per share, and the net worth of shareholders will go down. A will have an opposite 
situation:  earnings per share will be up, and net worth will rise.  But loss at one end and gain at 
the other end do not give the clear picture for market participants as a whole.  It simply raises the 
inter-subsidiary and inter-personal income redistribution, and the final result as to whether it is 
better or worse for the society is not ascertainable. 
2.3 The Profit-Maximizing Behavior of a Firm 
The traditional view that each firm optimizes the following maximand: 
)(())(( GXCGXR −=π        (4) 
Here ,π  R, C, X, and G stand for profit level, sales revenue, cost for the firm, output level, and 
public good, respectively.  Assuming “well, behaved” revenue and cost functions, one obtains 
that when the following conditions hold: 
       (5) 
   ∂2π / ∂X2=∂2R/∂X2 - ∂2C/∂X2 < 0    (6) 
profit is maximized.  Under this exercise, G is ignored as a ceteris paribus condition.   Before we 
bring this out, first let us point out the inadequacy of the results derived from (5) and (6).  We all 
know that (5) brings out the equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost as the necessary 
condition for profit maximization, and (6) defining the sufficiency condition spells out that the 




 marginal revenue  = price )11(
ε
−× , 
 where ε is the price elasticity of demand.  Since, it is a mere mathematical necessity that:  
 marginal revenue  >  0 only when ε  >  1; 
 marginal revenue  =  0 only when ε  = 1; 
 marginal revenue  < 0  only when ε   <  1, 
one can immediately conclude that the producers of goods and services with inelastic demand  
(that is, with ε  <  1) cannot reach a profit-maximizing situation when each additional output 
entails additional cost (signifying that  marginal cost is positive).  Baumol [5], Brown and 
Revankar [7], and Ghosh [15] have pointed out that profit-maximization alone cannot explain a 
firm’s behavior; some other objective(s) may be necessary to obtain the optimum. 
 As already pointed out, G – the provision of public good - has been ignored thus far.  
With its introduction, (5) and (6) are modified as (5*) and (6*): 
    (5*) 
and   
∂2π / ∂X2={∂2R/∂X2 - ∂2C/∂X2} (∂2X/∂G2) < 0    (6*) 
Here we postulate that 0)(),( >′= XfXfG , and hence, by Jacobi’s Theorem, X is invertible, - 
that is, .0)(),()(1 >′≡= − GFGFGfX  We do not know, however, if  ∂2X/∂G2  is greater than or 
equal to or less than 0, and hence (6*) is not necessarily satisfied for the firm unconditionally.  If 
the firm chooses the sales level that it thinks is profit-maximizing may, in turn, may be profit-
minimizing.  If ∂2X/∂G2 = 0, it is a point of inflection, and if ∂2X/∂G2 < 0, the firm is in its most 
suboptimal profit situation. The traditional belief holds if and only if ∂2X/∂G2 > 0. 
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It is a narrow view to assume that social good is a free good, and the firm has nothing to 
relate to it.  A public road is a public good, and if it is not there, as President Barack Obama of 
the United States remarked recently on his campaign trail, the firm has to incur additional cost to 
transport its outputs and inputs.  Without proper adequate infrastructure, business can hardly 
survive, and much less to thrive on.  Free-rider mind-set may give rise to the belief that ethics or 
regulation is inimical to business and profits.  A well-ordered environment, protected by laws 
that promote the harmony between consumers and producers, and ethics that stands as the terra 
firma of the laws can sustain a society with customers and vendors enjoying optimum position, 
side by side.   
Not too long ago, under the Clinton Administration the universal health care coverage, costs, 
and employer mandates had touched off a debate on the advisability of the plan and the 
survivability of small businesses. The Obama Administration has passed it into law. The point is 
often made that insurance premium on the employer will raise the costs, lower the profits to the 
vanishing point, causing hereupon the demise of business.  One point is ignored in this logic is 
that worry-free and healthy worker is a more efficient worker, and efficient worker means a 
higher output per input. It is like the Harrod-neutral (labor-augmenting) technical progress, 
which essentially contributes to the growth of the corporation.  Unless the efficiency elasticity of 
cost is estimated, it is futile to think even that insurance policy as being mandated is profit-
reducing. Thus, reduction in profit owing to insurance premium on employer is not a valid 
argument, particularly in the long-run context. If employers are what Hicks (1954) calls 
“snatchers” (of short-term profits) and not “stickers” (for long-term profits), universal health care 
coverage may not win; but a more dynamic, long-range view of business, ethics and profits in an 
international economic structure in which most competing countries have medical guarantee for 
workers can justify the Clinton proposal and the Obama’s Affordable Health Care law.  
2.4 Analytical Structure: Portfolio Manager Knows Investor’s Utility Function  
Next, take a step forward and move into an analytical development of portfolio selection, 
revision and comparative statics. Following the works of Royama  and Hamada (1967), Ghosh 
(1988), and Morishima (1993), who have done some of these exercises on the effects of 
parametric variations, we proceed by assuming that the current asset prices are normalized, and 
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each current price is then equal to 1; prices at the end of the period are expected to be 
........,,, 21 nppp  It means that  
 1+ ri = pi         (7) 
 i
i
i spM ∑=   
where pi’s is the price of the i-th asset, which is a stochastic variable. The investor’s expected 
values and variance co-variance terms are as follows: 
 E(pi) = µi, and E(pi - µi)( pj - µj) = σij  i, j = 1, 2,…, n. 













Assume that the investor maximizes his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function: 
 U = U(µ, σ) 








π , and so his maximand is the following Lagrangean: 







π                (8) 
where λ is the Lagrangean multiplier, and  (8) is the expression of constrained  maximization. 
Obviously, the first-order condition of the Lagrangean optimand results in the following 
expression: 
 .,....,2,12 nisUU ijiji ==+ ∑ λπσµ σµ      (9) 
Partial differentiation of (9) with respect to πk yields the following: 
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ασµµµ )2 ∑+ , jkδ  being the Kronecker delta.  
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B juj −= . Here it is noted that 0=∑ jr
j
j Zπ . 
 Consider a more well-accepted utility function à la von Neumann-Morgenstern as 
follows: 
 U(M) = M – 1/2aM2  a > 0 and M < 1/a    (13) 
where M = i
i
i sp )1(∑ + . In this case then one can derive the following: 









.      (14) 
These terms on the right-hand side are the standard Hicksian substitution and income effects. 
However, a change in kµ  affects the individual's demand through two channels: through the 
change in the relativity of kµ  to other iiµ ’s, and through the change in the absolute level 
of i
i
i s∑= µµ . In order to obtain the pure effect of kµ on rs , we introduce an imaginary 
change in µ  so as to leave the individual on-the same level of µ , as before. Such a 
compensated purely relative change in kµ gives rise to a change in the is ’s since, as (9) shows, 
the marginal rates of substitution between is ’s depend on their relative expected real values.  
This effect, which we may call the relative desire effect, is represented by the first term 
in (10). On the other hand, the change in the absolute level of µ , induced by the change 
in kµ , affects the marginal rate of substitution between µ andσ . If µ∂
∂B  > 0, then the indivi-
dual will be prepared to bear more risk than before when the absolute level of µ  is raised. 
Such a change in the individual's risk aversion brings about a change in the holding of assets, 
which is represented by the second term of (10); it may be called the absolute desire effect. 
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Evidently, a similar analysis may be made if a change in a current price pi induces a change 
in the variance of the real value of an asset or the covariance of the real values of some two 
assets. Optimum solution and comparative statics show that system works, and any irritations 
in the parameters such as manipulations by fiduciary will create chaos and instability, already 
noted through value creation of investors’ initial funds.  
 
3. Some Concluding Thoughts 
A profit versus ethics is an old debate resurfacing time and time again. It is an issue that involves 
individual gain and social welfare. A vast and penetrating literature, following the path-breaking 
analysis of  Arrow (1951),  Collard’s (1988) moral sentiments,  Gapinski’s  (1988) right angle of 
non-profit theater, Garfield’s (1999) profits and social responsibility mix, and so on have 
surfaced to highlight that profits and ethics are not inimical to each other. At times it may appear 
that social optimum is inconsistent with individual optimum choice, and at times these two ends 
seem to be mutually complementary.  In case of conflict between these two objectives, it is an 
“impossibility” to find the optimum.  A value judgment has to be made at this time, and one 
optimum has to be chosen in preference to the other.  
 If maximum good of the many is deemed better than the maximum good to one, maximum 
benefits to many must be the superior choice. Marris’s (1964) economic theory of “managerial” 
capitalism,  Svensson’s (1989) fairness, the veil of ignorance, and social choice,  Rawl’s (1971) 
theory of justice,  Schokkaet  and Overlaaet (1989) on moral intuition and economic models of 
distributive justice, Ginzberg and Solow’s work (1974) should lead us to recognize that ethics 
and profits can and should co-exist  on rational grounds. Social optimum is the choice in the 
society of many interests and individuals. The very acceptance of the government in our lives, 
and the “social contract” amongst the members of the society indicate that individual interest is 
subordinate to social welfare.  A macroeconomic structure with its full interactive feedback 
mechanism and mutatis mutandis provisions should justify profits with ethics than without more 
strongly and cogently. 
  In formal way one may visualize the social welfare (W ) as a function of agent’s utility 
( 1U ), business entities’ utility ( 2U ), and then we have the following: 
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),( 21 UUWW =         (15) 
where welfare function is quasi-concave.  Try to maximize this welfare function, subject to the 
following “well behaved” transformation function: 
0),( 21 =UUT  
So the problem is: 
 Max  ),( 21 UUWW =         (16) 
 subject to 0),( 21 =UUT         (17) 
This constrained maximization is simply a Lagrangean )(L  optimization: 
)},({),( 2121 UUTUUWL λ+=         (18) 
The canonical conditions on this optimization are as follows: 
 ∂L/∂U1 = 011 =+ TW λ         (19) 
 ∂L/∂U2= 022 =+ TW λ         (20) 
 ),(/ 21 UUTL =∂∂ λ         (21) 
where 0/,0/,0/,0/ 22112211 >∂∂≡>∂∂≡>∂∂≡>∂∂≡ UTTUTTUWWUWW            
From (19) and (20) we obtain: 
 W1/W2 = T1/T2        (22) 
Optimization yield the optimum social welfare: *1U and 
*
2U  define this optimum constellation. 
If  )( 21 UhU = , and 0)(/ 221 ≤′= UhdUdU  for 21 UU ≤  and  
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 0)(/ 221 >′= UhdUdU  for 21 UU >  
The optimum is ascertainable.  Hence, the impression that ethics is a profit-reducing instruments 
or a drag on business is a misconception.  With ethics, a business enterprise operates and 
optimizes in the world rationality. 
Author Information: S. Romila Palliam, JD, Instructor in Business Law, College of Business, 
Gulf University for Science and Technology, Kuwai. Phone: +(965)-2530-7424, Fax: +(965)-
2530-7030, E-mail: Palliam.S@gust.edu.kw. Lee G. Caldwell is Professor and Dean of the 
College of Business, Gulf University for Science and Technology, Kuwait. Phone:+(965)-2530-
7333, Fax: +(965)-2530-7030, E-mail: Caldwell.L@gust.edu.kw. Dilip K. Ghosh is Professor of 
Finance, College of Business, Gulf University for Science and Technology, Kuwait. Phone: 
+(965)-2530-7176, E-mail: ghosh.d @gust.edu.kw. Their common postal address is: Gulf 




IA Compliance Summit (2009). Building a Fiduciary Society. Washington, DC March 13. 
 
Agrawal, Anup and Charles R. Knoeber, (1996). Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control 
Agency Problems between s and Shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 31 (September): 377-397. 
Angelidis, John P.,  and Nabil A. Ibrahim. (1993). Social Demand and Corporate Supply:  A 
corporate Social Responsibility Model, Review of Business, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer/Fall.  
Ariff, M., and Iqbal, M., (2011). Foundation of Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice and Education. 
Edward Elgar Publishing UK and USA.  
Arrow, Kenneth, (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values, John Wiley & son, New York. 
 
Baumol, William J., (1959). Business Behavior, Value and Growth, Macmillan. 
 
------------------------, (1962). The Theory of the Expansion of the Firm, The American Economic 
Review, December, Vol. LII.  
-------------------------, (1970).The Firm with Inelastic Demand, in Induction, Growth and Trade:  
Essays in Honor of Sir Roy Harrod, eds. (1970). Ellis, W. A. and M.G.  Scott, and J. N. 
Wolfe, Oxford Clarendon Press.. 
Beekun and Badawi (2005). Balancing Ethical Responsibility among Multiple Stakeholders:    
The Islamic perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, No. 60. 




Bogle, J.C., (2005). The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism. Yale University Press, 2005. 
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal (1997). In Joostens Canada v Gibsons Studios (42 British 
Columbia Law Review 3d 149). 
Brown, Murray and Revankar, N. (1971).  A Generalized Theory of the Firm:  An Integration of 
the Sales and Profit Maximization Hypotheses, Kyklos, 1971. 
Bryan, S., Hwang L.S. and Lilien S., (2000). CEO Stock-based Compensation: An Empirical 
Analysis of Incentive-intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants, Journal of 
Business 73,661-693. 
Burke J., R. Grances, and A. Black, (1990). Improving Organizational Productivity:  Add Ethics  
Public Productivity and Management Review, Vol. XIV, 1, Winter. 
 
Clark, John B., (1939) Distribution of Wealth, Macmillan. 
 
Collard, D. A., (1988). New Moral Sentiments? A review [Well-being:  Its Meaning, 
Measurement and Moral Importance]. Oxford Economic Papers, N. S., June 1988, Vol. 40, 
No. 2. 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). “Toward a Stewardship Theory of 
Management,” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22. 
DeMott, D.A., (1988), An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, Duke Law Journal, No. 5.   
 
Demsetz H. and Kenneth Lehn (1985). The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences, Journal of Political Economy, 93: 1155-1177. 
Eden, Lorraine, (1998). Taxing Multinationals: Transfer Pricing and Corporate Income Taxation 
in North America, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. 
Fama, E. (1980).  Agency Problems and the theory of the firm.  Journal of Political Economy, 88: 
288-307. 
Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and 
Economics 26: 301-325. 
Flannigan, R.,(1989), The Fiduciary Obligation. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 9, No. 3, 
Autumn. 
Folwer, D. K., (1978). Transfer Prices and Profit Maximization in Multinational Enterprise 
Operations, Journal of International Business Studies, Winter. 
Friedman, M., (1970). The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, The New 
York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970.  
Gapinski, J. H., (1988). The Economic Right Triangle of Nonprofit Theater, Social Science 
Quarterly, September, Vol. 69, No. 3. 
Garfield, Charles A., (1999). Do Profits & Social Responsibility Mix? Executive Excellence, Vol. 
9, No. 3, March. 
Ghosh, Dilip K., (1978). Market Mechanism and the Maximization and the Maximization 
Principle, The Indian Journal of Economics, July Vol. LIX, Part I, No. 232. 
Ginzberg Eli and Robert M. Solow eds., (1974). The Great Society, Basic Books, Inc.  
 
Goodpaster, Kenneth E. and Johns B. Matthews, Jr., (1982). Can A Corporation Have A 
Conscience? Harvard Business Review, January-February.   
Grant, Colin, (1991). Friedman Fallacies, Journal of Business Ethics, 10: 907-914. 




Han, K.C., and David Y. Suk (1998). The Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance: 
Additional Evidence. Review of Financial Economics, vol. 7, no. 2:143–155. 
Hicks, John R.,(1954). The Process of Imperfect Competition, The Oxford Economic Papers.  
Jensen, M., Meckling, W., (1976). Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior, Agency costs, and 
Ownership structure.  Journal of financial economics, 3, pp. 305-360. 
Jensen, M., Murphy K., (1990). Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, Journal of 
Political Economy 98, 225-264. 
 
Kamali (1989). Source, Nature and Objectives of Shariah, The Islamic Quarterly, Vol 33, No. 4. 
 
Khan, A. A., and Thaut, L., (2007), ‘Islamic Perspective on Fair Trade’, Accessed August, 2012. 
  www.islamicrelief.com/InDepth/downloads/Islam_and_Fairtrade.pdf.  
Knight, Frank H., (1988) Risk, Uncertainly and Profit, Oxford University Press. 
 
Marris, R., (1964). The Economic Theory of “Managerial” Capitalism, The Free Press of 
Glencoe. 
McLachlin  (2003). Canada's Supreme Court in E.D.G. v Hammer 2003 SCC 52, S.C.R. 459. 
 
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1988). Management Ownership and 
Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293-315 
O’Neil, Robert F. and Darlene A. Pienta (1994), Economic Criteria versus Ethical Criteria Toward 
Resolving a Basic Dilemma in Business, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 13, 1, January. 
Ouchi William G., (1981). Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet The Japanese Challenge, 
Addison-Wesley. 
Owen, Crystal L. and Robert F. Scherer (1993). Social Responsibility and Market Share, Review 
of Business, Vol. 15, 1, Summer/Fall. 
Rawls, John, (1971). A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Schumpeter, J. A., (1927). The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Svensson, L., -G., (1989). Fairness, the Veil of Ignorance and Social Choice, Social Choice and 
Welfare, January, Vol. 6, No. 1.  
Schokkaet, E. and Overlaet, B., (1989). Moral Intuitions and Economic Models of Distributive 
Justice, Social Choice and Welfare, January, Vol. 6, No. 1.  
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny (1986). Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 94, no. 3(June): 461–488. 
Snyder, J. M., and G. H. Kramer, (1988). Fairness, Self-Interest, and the Politics of the 
Progressive Income Tax, Journal of Public Economics, July, Vol., 36, No. 2. 
Stone, Christopher D., (1975). Why Shouldn’t Corporations be Socially Responsible?, Where the 
Law Ends, New York: Harper and Row. 
Stone, H.F., (1934). Address to the University of Michigan School of Law, June 15, reprinted in 
Harvard Law Review. 
Williamson, Oliver, E., (1964). The Economics of Discretionary Behavior:  managerial Objectives 
in a Theory of the Firm, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
